

**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**HOW WOULD AN EIGHT-DIVISION ARMY MEET CURRENT AND  
LIKELY PROJECTED STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS?**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL M. CANNON  
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for Public Release.  
Distribution is Unlimited.**

**USAWC CLASS OF 2001**

**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**



**20010430 120**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**HOW WOULD AN EIGHT-DIVISION ARMY MEET CURRENT AND LIKELY PROJECTED STRATEGIC  
REQUIREMENTS?**

By

LTC Michael M. Cannon  
U. S. Army

**Professor Leonard J. Fullenkamp  
Project Advisor**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.



## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: LTC Michael M. Cannon

TITLE: HOW WOULD AN EIGHT-DIVISION ARMY MEET CURRENT AND LIKELY PROJECTED STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 2001 PAGES: 24 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The current Army force structure provides for ten active component divisions. Given an end strength of 480,000 active component personnel, this force structure continues to be a challenge to support. The issues that the Army continues to face in the areas of recruiting and retention are not short-term in nature. Given today's demographics and the projected future demographics of the primary recruited population of males and females ages 17 to 24, this challenge will only intensify as the Army and the other services continue to recruit approximately 200,000 + personnel each year to man their respective forces.

At a time when senior leaders are publicly calling for a larger end-strength to meet the multitude of smaller scale contingencies the military is engaged in globally, the reality of the situation is that a smaller force may be more manageable given resources and demographics. It is my intent to show how that force can execute all of its assigned missions and meet the requirements of the President's National Security Strategy, the Chairman's National Military Strategy, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

What I propose is that the Army reshape itself within the 480,000-person force structure from ten divisions to eight divisions, and fully manning an eight-division force vice reduced manning in the larger Army thereby gaining efficiencies that an undermanned force does not enjoy.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| ABSTRACT .....   | III |
| PREFACE.....   | VII |
| LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....   | XI  |
| HOW WOULD AN EIGHT-DIVISION ARMY MEET CURRENT AND LIKELY PROJECTED STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS? ..... | 1   |
| ARMY MANNING .....   | 1   |
| TRADOC .....   | 2   |
| RECRUITING/RETENTION .....   | 3   |
| NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY .....   | 6   |
| MODERNIZATION.....   | 8   |
| STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES.....  | 9   |
| DEFENSE BUDGET.....  | 12  |
| FORCE STRUCTURE .....  | 12  |
| CURRENT STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS .....   | 14  |
| FUTURE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS .....  | 17  |
| ENDNOTES .....   | 21  |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....  | 23  |



## PREFACE

In an era when the Secretary of the Army as well as the Chief of Staff of the Army are calling for a larger Army, how is it that a proposal for a smaller force could be made almost simultaneously? In the October 2000 edition of the Armed Forces Journal International Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera was asked, "Does the Army need to be bigger?" He responded, "Yes, I think that if the Army is going to be as busy as it is, then it ought to be a bit larger. In order to do theater-level operations we need an Army that is of a larger size. That is very consistent with what (now-retired Central Command chief United States Marine Corps) General (Anthony) Zinni said – the Army should be 12 or 13 divisions." The Chief of Staff of the Army added, "I feel, in my gut, that we have an end-strength problem. The service is too small for the missions it has, and is under-resourced for what it is being asked to do," according to an interview with the Armed Forces Journal international.

Given the accelerating tempo of U. S. Military modernization there will ultimately be a bill payer for the \$475 billion it will cost to build these various systems that will replace aging equipment that is quickly approaching the end of its projected service life. The bill payer has not been clearly identified, but the writing is on the wall. Personnel programs, including pay, retirement benefits, healthcare, and other programs may ultimately make way for procurement requirements. In addition to the pressures of procurement there are several other dynamics that are affecting the services' ability to recruit and retain quality personnel. These challenges are not temporary and will only persist. As the population ages (the baby boomers) the amount of the Federal budget dedicated to their health and welfare will only increase and put pressure on other programs in the Federal budget. The decreasing incidence of military veterans in households, the U. S. Congress, and other facets of our society will make it more challenging for the services to tell their story to America's youth and encourage them to serve their nation.

Today, the task of mobilizing public support for National Security priorities is more complicated. The complex array of unique dangers, opportunities and responsibilities outlined

in the National Security Strategy are not always readily apparent as we go about our daily lives focused on immediate concerns. This is apparent, as the Army's buying power has decreased by 37 percent from FY1989 to FY1999. Over this time a significant mismatch has developed between the Army's strategy and its budget, a situation not likely to improve in the coming decades. Eventually, budgets, commitments, and force levels will have to be brought in line. Force levels cannot be brought into focus without clear strategic concepts. The role of the U. S. Army and its strategic significance is being questioned. Decisions on these strategic concepts will have significant implications for the size and the role of the United States Army.

This study looks at several sources of information that will show the current trends in demographics, attitudes, budgets, modernization, and the expectations of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as the National Security Strategy of the 43<sup>rd</sup> President. Trends apparent in these sources will show that the Army faces an uphill battle, a battle that may be insurmountable when looking at the demographics of its target recruit audience. The attitudes of this target audience are analyzed in the annual Youth Attitude Tracking Survey. Furthermore, proposed budgets will change, and the planned outlays up to 2005 are studied. Army modernization plans will have a direct affect on the force structure and what is actually affordable. Any new or revised strategic concepts from the 2001 QDR or the NSS that may differ from the Shape Respond, and Prepare strategy that is the overarching theme of the 1999 National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, will impact the force in ways we can only speculate on at the current time.

According to the Secretary of Defense, as stated in his year 2000 annual report to the President and the Congress, transformed military forces are needed because the strategic environment is changing; they are possible because of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Technology, vastly changing the civilian world, is changing the military sphere as well. Exploited effectively, through innovative operational concepts and new organizational arrangements, new information systems and other technologies will allow U. S. forces to be

smaller, faster, more agile, more precise, and better protected according to the Secretary of Defense in his Annual report to the President and the Congress. In theory, the U. S. Army is going to be smaller as a result, but much more effective in supporting the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

|  |    |
|--|----|
| FIGURE 1_“SKIPPED” GENERATION OF MODERNIZATION PLANS IN FY02 .....     | 7  |
| FIGURE 2_DOD PERSONNEL, MODERNIZATION, AND BUDGET OPTIONS, FY2002-2010 | 11 |



## **HOW WOULD AN EIGHT-DIVISION ARMY MEET CURRENT AND LIKELY PROJECTED STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS?**

The United States Army has taken steps to increase the manning levels of its warfighting organizations. This is the beginning of a transformation to a more capable force. It is a conditioned-based strategy that ensures that certain conditions are met before the implementation of subsequent decisions to continue on a selected glidepath or course of action. During the course of this transformation the Army's conceptual framework will lead to a changing force structure as well as a changing institutional base. It is inevitable that given today's challenges of recruiting, retention, national budget priorities, an aging population, lower birth rates, no peer superpower competitor, and other pressures facing the U. S. Army into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, an eight division Army is manageable with an end-strength of 480,000 personnel. The following illustrations will detail this assertion.

### **ARMY MANNING**

Another feature of this transformation is the distribution of personnel to fill all operational and institutional organizations to 100 percent of authorizations, by grade, and skill, by the end of FY2003. The Army will pursue this distribution in a measured fashion to ensure that all units retain the capability to perform their missions. The current schedule for personnel actions calls for filling all divisions and armored cavalry regiments to 100 percent of their authorized strength by the end of FY2000, and resolving imbalances to attain the correct numbers of each grade and skill by April 2001. By the end of FY2001, the Army will fill the units above division level that would deploy in the first 35 days to support Major Theater of Wars (MTW's). All remaining operational units are to be filled by the end of FY 2002, and institutional authorizations approved by the Department of the Army are to be filled to 100 percent by the end of FY2003.<sup>1</sup> This is an enormous undertaking and an early observation of the results of this policy is an Army training command that is operating well below its authorized levels of manning, and a concern that the training base is the bill payer for the early stages of transformation.

## TRADOC

General John J. Abrams, chief of the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recently released an assessment of how personnel and equipment shortages are affecting the development of hundreds of thousands of soldiers each year. This assessment was released in a Washington Times article by Rowan Scarborough dated 8 January 2001. According to General Abrams, "Training modernization is broken across the force and will not keep pace with force modernization. The problem gets progressively worse over the next five years. Although the command is achieving its primary mission, it is important to note that this is made possible at the expense of our other core mission areas. Of significance is the fact that we do not have the dollars or manpower to determine and develop functional user requirements...unless funding increases across the board, TRADOC will fall further behind in these key development areas which underpin the future Army."<sup>2</sup> Harvey Perritt, a TRADOC spokesman said that the command is operating at 26 percent below its authorized manning levels. This is a sobering assessment coming as it does from a command that endured national scrutiny over the Aberdeen Proving Grounds training school incident involving sexual harassment at the center of the controversy. Some of the feedback on this issue was that the command suffered from shortage of quality leaders at the lower level that may have allowed these conditions to exist.

Personnel shortages affect the other combat and support training institutions to the point that twelve of these schools dipped to a C-4 readiness rating, the lowest rating. Some commanding generals have warned that these shortages cause a risk of not being able to turn out qualified soldiers. Major General Tony Stricklin, commandant of the U. S. Army Field Artillery Training Center stated that, "In the three-year period since the time I was the assistant commandant to now, I have never seen a resource picture so bleak. And as we know, it will get worse...Let me clearly state the U. S. Army Field Artillery School is nearing an unready state for training artillery soldiers."<sup>3</sup> The commandants of the aviation training center and the signal

training center have articulated similar concerns. These shortfalls stem from declining Army budgets and the ongoing effort to fully man the ten Army active divisions and armored cavalry regiments.

Non-divisional units like the multiple launch rocket battalions of III Corps Artillery stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma are experiencing shortages that approach 40 percent of their authorized manning. Why do these conditions exist? There apparently is a shortage of people to fully man the Army at 100 percent of its authorized strength. Given an end-strength of 480,000 soldiers with 310,000 soldiers in the operational army (TOE), 110,000 soldiers in the institutional army (TDA), and 60,000 in the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account (not available for specific mission use) the numbers do not tell the whole story. That story is beyond the scope of this paper, but an eight-division force structure may be more supportable given our current end-strength. We cannot allow the institutional army to operate at these reduced levels of manning. We have learned a hard lesson only recently on the impacts of not resourcing the training base adequately.

## **RECRUITING/RETENTION**

The additional challenge the U. S. Army faces in manning the force is recruiting. Although the Army met its recruiting goal of 80,000 new recruits in FY2000, the cost was high. Increased levels of authorized manning in the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (8,114 NCO's assigned as per 28 DEC 00 up from just under 7,000 NCO's) took seasoned Non-Commissioned Officers out of the Operational Army and put them in recruiting positions. On the surface that is a good news story, but when these leaders are taken out of their units and not replaced one-for-one there is going to be a vacuum. While the recruiting command celebrated a victory there was definitely a cost. A tremendous amount of experience left the Operational Army to make this happen. One former battalion commander was reportedly amazed at how many of his howitzer section chiefs were being levied (put on military orders) to recruiting

command. A large number were also being levied for Drill Sergeant duty. He keenly felt the loss of experience on the “line of metal” that he believed was essential in order to train his soldiers.<sup>4</sup> This is partly what contributes to the observations of the observer-controllers at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center on recent rotations over the past two years where there has been a noticeable decline in the state of training of units on rotations “in the box.” Brigade Task Forces are operating with junior leaders in some cases that are not fully trained for the position they are currently assigned to in their organizations. NCO shortages contribute to this reality.

The cost of recruiting one soldier has doubled over the past 14 years and is now \$12,000.00 per recruit. Recruiting will be the top military personnel challenge for the Department of Defense. Pentagon personnel chief, Bernard Rostker has said that, “We have to learn how to recruit a different kind of person...Twenty years ago, less than half the high school graduating class went to college. Today the number is approaching 80 percent yet current pay tables and recruiting efforts focus on the high school graduate...”<sup>5</sup> The Army is aware that too many 17-24 year olds think that military service is dehumanizing and stifling. The new Army advertising campaign looks at the target audiences’ values and lifestyles as per the annual Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS). This is a computer-assisted telephone interview of a sample of 10,000 young men and women. Results from the 1999 survey indicated that the propensity of youth for military service was higher than it has been in the past few years. This is good news as more resources are dedicated to recruitment and retention. The cost of recruiting one new soldier has increased as earlier indicated, but the cost of replacing a recruit who leaves the service prematurely is \$35,000.00 per recruit. This highlights the need to reduce first-term attrition.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) looked at attitudes and expectations of today’s military personnel in their report on American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century. Part of their findings articulated the challenge that the Army’s leadership

faces in the new millennium. "The leadership of the Armed Forces has not yet adjusted to the reality that there are insufficient resources and personnel to match missions. This raises the question of whether the allocation of resources, the number of missions, the methods of leadership and management, the military's traditional expectation for universal excellence, or some combination of these factors must change. A sustained inability to attain expected levels of mission readiness may lead to a cynical view on the part of service members about the institution's standards and goals and may erode confidence in institutional leadership."<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps this is what is contributing to the retention problem the Army is experiencing with its junior leaders as mentioned earlier. The officers and NCO's that General Abrams refers to as the "workhorse" grade of our forces have shown a decreased propensity to serve as measured over the past nine years. This propensity to serve has decreased by 17 percent for NCO's and 13 percent for junior officers as listed in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and the Congress.<sup>7</sup> The Army continues to watch these trends as concerns over retention continue. The issue of retention extends beyond retaining the first-term soldier, as the number of mid-grade leaders becomes increasingly difficult to retain. There are even concerns about more senior leaders (lieutenant colonels and colonels) who have turned down command of organizations after they have been selected to command.

Recruiting challenges are exacerbated by the demographics of the primary recruited audience, 17-24 year old men and women. Census data from the last census (1990) showed resident population projections by age and sex from 1999 to 2050. The data indicated a moderate increase in the target population up to year 2015, then another decline out to year 2030, and a moderate increase out to the year 2050. The 2000 Census data has not yet been released but perhaps the numbers will show a different trend. In addition to the population out to 2050, the number of individuals in this country below the age of 18 has decreased since 1995. The birth rate per 1000 people has decreased since 1990 from 16.7 to 14.5 in 1999.<sup>8</sup> All


of these factors put pressure on the recruiting effort and even with an approved end-strength increase of 30,000 to 50,000 personnel it appears that the Army will be hard pressed to fill its ranks with quality people. A force of 480,000 (and perhaps even less) is what the Army will have to shape its transformation efforts. This is not a bad thing, but what we must do is to move beyond the undermanning of units in the Army today. The implications of an undermanned force are adverse across the board.

## NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton has said that balancing the national security strategy with available military forces -- something that he clearly sees as being out of line today -- could be accomplished by cutting military commitments, changing the mix of skills in the force or increasing personnel levels. The congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 will determine what the National Military Strategy will be, and the forces required to carry it out. The previous QDR was flawed in that it was budget-driven versus strategy-driven which led to an in-balance in force structure and strategy. The Army has been able to carry out this strategy with its current force structure, but there have been associated costs. Soldiers and families have felt the strain. General Abrams has said that personnel shortages at the mid-grade and junior leader level have forced TRADOC to, "put relatively inexperienced captains in the vast majority of instructor and doctrine development billets." To make matters worse he says, "There are not sufficient captains. This critical manpower shortage very seriously impacts our ability to conduct quality training and severely limits our capability to do doctrine, training and combat development work for the Army. Personnel availability is unsatisfactory."<sup>9</sup>

The 43<sup>rd</sup> President, George W. Bush, has said that today's military is, "still more organized for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century. There is almost no relationship between our budget priorities and a strategic vision." The President goes on to say

that the military is organized, "for Industrial Age operations rather than for Information Age battles."<sup>10</sup> To take advantage in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) the Army may have to "skip a generation of weapons" (Figure 1 indicates we may have already done so) to facilitate the transition to this information age that the President is referring to in his statement. Figure 1 is a graphical depiction from the Army's 2001 Modernization Plan. The two "spikes" in the defense budget occurred during the Vietnam War and the Reagan buildup. The "skipped"



generation is depicted during FY02 where there is no such "spike." This is the \$100 billion dollar peace dividend that was paid and not reinvested into modernization programs.

FIGURE 1—"SKIPPED" GENERATION OF MODERNIZATION PLANS IN FY02

In the Army Posture Statement of FY01 it states that, "the Army has remained ready at all times to meet the warfighting requirements of the NMS: to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater of wars (MTW's). We are able today to meet the requirements for the first MTW with moderate risk, but there would be higher levels of risk associated with fighting a second MTW."<sup>11</sup> This risk, articulated in the executive summary of the U. S. Army's Posture Statement, does not bode well for today's men and women of the force who will have to bear the brunt of that risk when charged with defending the national security interests of this nation. In short, risk must be minimized. A whole new series of hardware purchases is not the answer. What we must commit ourselves to in the future is the development of a generation of leaders who are properly resourced to execute their combat critical tasks. These leaders will be developed in the training base and matured during their operational unit experiences. We cannot absorb personnel and resource shortfalls in our training base or in the operational army any longer, nor can we afford to "skip a generation of weapons" lest we inadvertently skip the full development of a generation of leaders.

## **MODERNIZATION**

The modernization programs that are on the horizon and the budgets that will be available to support them may also preclude the transition to a smaller force. For more than ten years defense budgets have not kept up with the needs of the Armed Forces. If this trend continues a military that is smaller than the one we have today is on the horizon, perhaps as much as one-third its present size. If the force structure does not change then the equipment cannot be replaced at a rate that facilitates modernization. Given this, perhaps 60 percent of the force may become obsolete.

Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney assert in their book, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium, "We estimate annual DOD budget shortfalls of nearly \$100 billion during the next five years (FY2001-2005) on the basis of the cost characteristics of the current

planned military force and the future defense budget levels currently projected by the Clinton administration, given its long-range vision for the nation and its budget priorities. This situation of underfunding national defense is not new; it has been going on for sometime and will take years to overcome. Military spending is dangerously low in relation to U. S. foreign policy and national security interests-which remain global and immense.<sup>12</sup> This viewpoint has at times been dismissed as too pessimistic, but the numbers most certainly do not add up to a force structure that will increase in size over any period of time in the future. Simply put, the "writing is on the wall" and the Army would be prudent to plan accordingly.

In 1992 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin advocated that when policymakers decide on the future size and shape of U. S. military forces, "it is critical to identify threats to U. S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them."<sup>13</sup> DOD force planning therefore must be threat-based as per the secretary's contention. Budget driven top-down force planning will not work. Reduced budgets will leave us with a smaller force. Bottom-up force planning based on the threat will give this country a military and an Army that is properly sized for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The citizenry of this country look for the national security establishment to protect the vital interests of the nation as listed in the NSS or those events or leaders that are perceived as being threatening to the country. In this era of shrinking budgets, proposed trillion dollar plus tax cuts, and new priorities for social security spending, Americans may not be as willing to pay for the defense required to modernize this country's forces.

## **STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES**

The 1997 QDR force structure results looked at three paths or courses of action for the Army's active component divisions. Referred to as Strategic Objectives of Alternative QDR Force Postures, the three paths looked at near-term demands, preparing for a distant future, and balancing current demands and an uncertain future. The near-term approach as well as the


balanced approach called for ten Army divisions. In preparing for a distant future the recommendation was for eight Army divisions. This path was defined as, "Defense resources are allocated on the basis of ensuring the long-term dominance of U. S. forces by preparing now for the emergence of more challenging threats in the future while accepting reductions in our capabilities to meet near-term demands."<sup>14</sup> This path cuts two divisions, and nine reserve Army brigades as well as other forces. It also requires reductions in permanently stationed forces overseas. This would affect the requirement to keep 100,000 military personnel in both Asia and Europe. It would also increase an already high personnel and deployment tempo for some units. Although, this path was not selected, the fact that it was considered and developed for discussion and analysis indicates the need to revisit this issue as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Goure and Ranney also contend that the top line on the DOD budget is unlikely to grow anytime soon. Their contention is that, "Absent a clear and present danger the 43<sup>rd</sup> President and the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress will find it difficult to increase military spending substantially during their terms in office. Their actions will take place within an overall demographic context in which the number of baby-boom generation reaches retirement age and succeeding generations, reflecting lower birth rates, reach working age. The economic affects of this demographic trend will be a gradual and extended slowdown in the annual growth of real GDP... The situation in turn may stimulate and intensify a guns vs. retirement check political debate in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century."<sup>15</sup> Given this the budget trends point toward large force structure reductions. In order to pay for the modernization required in the last QDR the current force of 1.36 million military personnel would have to decrease by 360,000 just to pay for 75 percent of what is required. The figure below shows the correlation of the number of active duty personnel in the Armed Forces and the percentage of the QDR force that can be modernized given the force structure. Bottom line, the larger the force the less the modernization of equipment and facilities as per the last QDR. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of the QDR force that can be modernized given the end strength of the Armed forces. The higher the end-strength the lower the

percentage of the QDR force that can be financed. The circle labeled "a" is the president's budget projection for FY2002 in which the U. S. will spend \$275 billion on defense and maintain an active duty end-strength of 1.37 million personnel. If defense spending were maintained at this level for FY2001 to FY2010, it would leave, as shown in Figure 2, enough procurement dollars to pay for modernization and replacement of only 44 percent of the force.<sup>16</sup> If the defense spending top-line were 3 percent of GDP, as depicted on the top line, the percentage of the QDR force that could be modernized would increase. It is more likely that in the out years the top-line of the defense budget will look more like the bottom line here, or 2.5 percent of GDP. This shows the pressure that would be put on the force structure to free up budget money to facilitate the modernization process.

## **DOD Personnel, Modernization, and Budget Options, FY 2002–2010**

---



Source: MSTI estimates.

- a 1.37 million active-duty force; 2.8 percent of GDP spent on defense (FY 2002)
- b 1.37 million active-duty force; 2.4 percent of GDP spent on defense (FY 2009)
- c 1 million active-duty force; 3 percent of GDP (indexed) spent on defense
- d 1 million active-duty force; 2.5 percent of GDP (indexed) spent on defense

**FIGURE 2**

## **DEFENSE BUDGET**

There are other options available to the President and the Congress as they consider structuring the forces with the requirement to modernize. The top line on the DOD budget has been steadily decreasing since the 1985 high of 7 percent of the GDP. The projection for the DOD budget for FY2002 is 2.8 percent of the GDP. The DOD budget could be a fixed share of the GDP. This would ensure that there would be some growth in the top line of the defense budget. This assumes a benign inflationary environment. Another option for the Executive and Legislative branches would call for a reduction in active duty personnel end-strengths. Personnel cuts could take many shapes, but in order to fund the procurement of military hardware, the personnel of the Armed Forces would be directly affected. Personnel in the active force, the infrastructure, as well as from outsourced work programs that support DOD missions would be affected.

Decisions on overall DOD budget levels and the number of active duty personnel will determine the spending available for future force modernization. Force modernization will determine the size and technological sophistication of future military capabilities.<sup>17</sup> What force will replace the QDR force? The answer seems obvious; a force that adopts the technology spawned by the Revolution in Military Affairs. Of course the follow-on question is: Can the nation afford an RMA equipped force? Without larger defense budgets and significant reductions in operations and support costs, the military services will have no choice but to make larger force structure and personnel reductions. The new force might be smaller, older, and possibly less capable – especially if performance capabilities are minimized to meet cost goals.<sup>18</sup>

## **FORCE STRUCTURE**

All of this points toward a force the size of the Army's currently authorized active duty strength of 480,000 personnel. Given the transformation of military forces and the

technology that is rapidly changing our world, we can exploit this technology through innovative operational concepts and new organizational arrangements, new information systems and other technologies that will allow the Army to be smaller, faster, more agile, more precise, and better protected.<sup>19</sup> This translates into an Army that is more capable of meeting the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A smaller force does not necessarily mean that the force is less capable, especially if equipped with a generation of systems that are information-based versus industrial-based as stated by President Bush during the recent campaign. An information-centric Army, where the soldier and all operating systems are networked, is the goal that our leaders are working toward as we transform the force to accommodate this technology. It is apparent that the Army may have to trade in some of its force structure to finance this transformation to an information-centric force, and planning for that trade-off is prudent.

The 1997 QDR was viewed as being an overly conservative assessment of the Defense requirements of this nation. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments contend that the last QDR leaned toward short-term expediency and did not have a robust and imaginative approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs. Carl Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives held that the QDR made no changes to a military that is, "sized, structured, equipped, and budgeted to deal primarily with contingencies and threats that grow less substantial everyday," particularly large-scale, cross border invasion by a "rouge state"<sup>20</sup> The Defense Science Board accused the Department of Defense of having no DOD-wide strategy for transformation and therefore no sense of urgency for fundamental change. Members of Congress and defense analysts pointed to the Pentagon's major acquisition programs that called for systems designed for large conventional battles rather than new missions and threats including the F-22 air superiority fighter, the Crusader artillery system, the Navy's new attack submarines, and the nine new anti-armor weapons under development.<sup>21</sup>

Dr. Steve Metz in his, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review, contends that there are obvious reasons for the less-than-total commitment to transformation on the part of the American military. One is the intrinsic conservatism seen in all large, bureaucratic organizations. It would be extraordinarily difficult for the senior leaders of the military and the Department of Defense to abandon totally the organizations, concepts, and procedures they have spent a lifetime mastering.<sup>22</sup> This contention by Dr. Metz does not bode well for the Army as it has traditionally received the smallest percentage of the Defense budget relative to the other services. Army transformation must compete with the other services for critically needed dollars for modernization. This will put additional pressure on the need to perhaps trade force structure for modernization programs.

## CURRENT STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

The question that now has to be answered is how an eight-division Army would meet its current strategic requirements. Once this is done we will look at projected strategic requirements, those requirements that will be defined by President Bush and the 2001 QDR.

In order to keep this project unclassified, this study will not use unit designations or numbered Operational Plans, or refer to a region. The National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy specifically lays out U. S. Army requirement to support the two Major Theater of War strategies, and with what kind of organizations are required to support the geographic Commander's-In-Chief (CINC). Currently there is a requirement for ten active Army divisions to support the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). There is a mixture of Heavy/Light forces as well as armored cavalry regiments, the Ranger regiment, and the airborne/air assault divisions. Eight reserve component brigades are also apportioned to support operational and contingency plans.

Since the JSCP was published two divisional headquarters have been activated. These divisions have three enhanced separate brigades assigned to them (eSB's). These are non-

deployable divisional headquarters that are responsible for the training of these enhanced separate brigades. It is my contention that these brigades will take on an increased level of responsibility when a reduced force is fielded and the Army has to meet its JSCP requirements. These brigades can deploy and support the CINC's in their geographic areas of responsibility.

The two overriding National Military Objectives for the U. S. Armed forces are to promote peace and stability and defeat adversaries. A two Major Theater of War strategy is a component of U. S. defense strategy and is a JSCP deliberate planning task. Forces are apportioned by "cases" to manage multi-apportionment of limited forces. Upon execution of the first Major Theater of War, if the NCA determines a second MTW unlikely, they may allocate forces from the second MTW to the first MTW.

Some guidelines will have to be established for prioritizing limited numbers of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. There were over 870,000 soldiers deployed in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations for Operation Desert Storm. This is a luxury the country will not be able to count on in a "two nearly simultaneous MTW" theater. The case concept was developed to satisfy the requirement to provide forces for two nearly simultaneous MTW's. This permits available forces to be split between both theaters and ensures that force lists for the two MTW's have been deconflicted and highlights shortfalls in certain key capabilities. Cases are additive. Case 1 can include Case 2 forces and so on. In addition, swing forces may be redeployed between theaters and be planned as a branch in a plan. Second MTW planners may develop a branch to their plan that identifies force shortfalls in particular phases that can be sourced by the forces of the first MTW to help mitigate risk in each phase. Planners should consider altering the concept of operations to account for the increased risk attributable to these shortfalls. These can be referred to as adaptive planning constructs. The NCA may make dual apportioned forces available at execution if they are not required for other National missions.

Although there is going to be some risk associated with the reduction of one heavy and one light division from the JSCP there are six enhanced separate brigades that can remove some of the concern about the loss of two divisions out of the Army's force structure, but the requirement is to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous MTW's. This allows the CINC's some flexibility if that scenario actually transpired. The National Command Authorities would certainly be involved in the "swinging" of forces between theaters as per the flow of operations and what phase of the operation forces in a particular theater are operating in at the time.

The bigger issue in the delineation of forces between theater CINC's is the airlift/sealift to get forces into theater. General Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff has said that the U. S. Air Force will never have enough Strategic lift to support two simultaneous MTW's despite ongoing modernization efforts. The U. S. according to General Ryan, has, "a one-major theater of war airlift force."<sup>23</sup> Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo) said that, "simple-third grade arithmetic" showed that the proposed force could not handle two major conflicts.<sup>24</sup> Daniel Goure of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has written that, "Those in key DoD leadership positions have known for years that they could not support the strategy of fighting two near-simultaneous MTW's. They kept silent principally out of a fear that to admit the truth would leave the services open to a new round of force reductions."<sup>25</sup>

Case 1 forces are apportioned for pre-hostilities and flexible deterrent options, Case 2 forces are apportioned for lodgment operations, Case 3 forces are apportioned for decisive force and Case 4 forces are apportioned for follow-through/no-warning attack. These cases allow the deliberate apportionment of forces as per the CINC's needs. This allows for branch planning and maximizing the use of available forces at the right time. Forces are also apportioned as "A" and "B" forces as per the magnitude of the action in a particular theater. Current reality also requires an asymmetrical approach to warfare. Forces in this scenario are highly specialized and not employed in mass, as could be the case in the two MTW scenario.

Limited numbers of combat support/combat service support units will require some of the same kinds of considerations in force planning.

Given the advent of "casing" forces, swinging forces between theaters, and the apportioning of forces, a case can be made that an eight-division Army with six enhanced brigades can support the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the requirement to be able to support a two nearly simultaneous MTW.

## FUTURE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

The next question that will have to be answered is what will the future strategic requirements be that the Army will have to meet given a force structure of eight active component divisions? There are alternative strategies that have been analyzed for the upcoming 2001 QDR. There are five alternatives and each one merits equal analysis.

The first alternative is the current shape, respond, and prepare strategy that the U. S. currently uses as its approach to defense strategy. There are variants to this strategy. But it is a good baseline for other analysis of strategic concepts. The second alternative is a counter – asymmetric strategy. This is based on the assumption that the current strategy prepares us for the wrong kind of challenge. This approach de-emphasizes forces and capabilities used for traditional force-on-force combat in open terrain, and focus instead on counter-terrorism, homeland defense, missile defense, urban operations, and other activities that could interdict asymmetric activities. The third alternative strategy is called preventive defense. In this strategic concept military power should be used to promote and protect all three levels of U. S. National interests; vital, important, and humanitarian. The U. S. would become involved in many kinds of issues and in many places, one of unconstrained enlargement and engagement. Alternative four is a concept called Supporting Regional Structures. The U. S. as the dominant coalition partner of today would reverse this so that the normal state of affairs would be for the U. S. to support a coalition partner rather than be the supported one.

The last strategic concept to be considered is a Strategic Reconfiguration. This would refocus American strategy so that Small Scale Contingencies (SSC's) are equal to or have a higher priority than MTW's and refocusing U. S. land forces on SSC's. This is based on an assumption that MTW's instigated by cross-border aggression by rogue states is becoming less likely, and that if it did come it could be countered with regional forces and a stand-off U. S. capability.<sup>26</sup>

Although the future is uncertain, the strategy that gives us the most flexibility is the second alternative of a counter-asymmetric strategy. The assumption is that our current strategy of being able to fight in two "nearly-simultaneous" Major Theaters of War prepares us for the wrong kind of challenge in the future. Our current transformation strategy, and an eight-division 480,000 person force, prepares the Army for future threats, including being able to counter the asymmetric threat. This strategy de-emphasizes the "Desert Storm" scenario (the scenario that the Major Theater of War concept is patterned from) and orients forces and their development and training on countering terrorism, being able to fight in an urban environment, defending the continental United States, theater missile defense, and other activities. As former Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer admitted, "nobody is going to go against us, tank against tank, soldier against soldier. Instead the potential enemies will look for asymmetrical responses."<sup>27</sup> This contention is the best reason for the U. S. Army to prepare for future strategic requirements using the current force structure and the transformation of those forces to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century global defense challenges.

There is some consensus that the U. S. should move toward a National Security Strategy that stresses collaboration and partnership rather than dominance and unilateralism (a principle of moderation versus a principle of mass). U. S. strategy is approaching a point of decisive action that will shape the future. The Army has to think strategically vice operationally during this developmental stage. One has to ask what should be done and what could be done so that the Army maintains its relevancy in the new millennium and during this transformation

process. An eight-division Army with a 480,000 person force structure is the first of those tasks that should be done to help the Army maintain its relevancy.

Word Count = 5,904



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Louis Caldera, and GEN Eric K. Shinseki, United States Army Posture Statement FY01, (Washington, D. C., February 2000), 20.

<sup>2</sup> Rowan Scarborough, General Details Army Shortfall, (The Washington Times, January 8, 2001), 1,2.

<sup>3</sup> Rowan Scarborough, Army Training Centers Get Failing Grades, (The Washington Times, August 29, 2000), 1,2.

<sup>4</sup> This is a personal experience the author has had in his recent experience while assigned to the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division as an Artillery Battalion Commander (28 February 1998 to 17 march 2000). During that two-year period several experienced non-commissioned officers were placed on orders for duty with the U. S. Army Recruiting Command as well as duty with the Training and Doctrine Command as Drill Instructors. This created an experience vacuum in the battalion at the junior leader level. Sergeant E-5's were moving up to be Howitzer Section Chiefs and Fire Support Team Chief's. Some were ready for the experience and others were not ready. A comprehensive certification program helped with this experience shortfall, but as a battalion commander there was always concern about the experience level of the junior leaders, particularly during live-fire training that included "danger-close" fires and firing at minimum safe distances.

<sup>5</sup> Vince Crawley, Pentagon Officials Stress Need to Meet Recruiting Challenge, ((The Army Times, January 8, 2001), 14.

<sup>6</sup> Edwin Dorn and Howard D. Graves, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington, D. C. February 2000), xxi.

<sup>7</sup> William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D. C., 2000), 184.

<sup>8</sup> U. S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief—Population and Vital Statistics, (Washington, D. C. January 17, 2001), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Rowan Scarborough, General Details Army Shortfall, (The Washington Times January 8, 2001), 2.

<sup>10</sup> Andrea Stone and Dave Moniz, Next President Must Transform USA's. Forces, (USA Today, October 3, 2000), 18.

<sup>11</sup> Louis Caldera, and GEN Eric K. Shinseki, United States Army Posture Statement FY01, (Washington, D. C., February 2000), xi.

<sup>12</sup> Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium, (Washington, D. C., 1999), xiv.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 112.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>19</sup> William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, D. C., 2000), ix.

<sup>20</sup> Steven Metz, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, D. C. September 2000), 27.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Goure and Jeffrey M. Ranney, Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium, (Washington, D. C., 1999), 45.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>26</sup> Steven Metz, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, D. C., September 2000), 56, 75,81,86, and 91.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.,76.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Goure, Daniel and Ranney, Jeffrey M. Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium. Washington, D. C.: The CSIS Press: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999.
- Metz, Steven, American Strategy: Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.
- Cohen, William S., Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, D. C.: Department of Defense, 2000.
- Sullivan, Gordon R., Fiscal Year 2001 Army Budget: An Analysis. Washington, D. C.: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2000.
- Binnendijk, Hans and Kugler, Richard, Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World. Washington, D. C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999.
- Shinseki, Eric K. and Caldera, Louis, A Statement and Posture of the United States Army: Fiscal Year 2001. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Congressional Activities Division, 2000.
- Dorn, Edwin and Graves, Howard D. American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D. C.: The CSIS Press: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000.
- Cohen, William S., Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997.
- Shalikashvili, John M., National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
- Clinton, William J., A national Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D. C.: The White House, 1999.
- Sherman, Jason, Momentum, Mo' Money: What 12 Months of Army Transformation Efforts Have Yielded. Washington, D. C.: Armed Forces Journal International, 2000.
- Gold, Philip, Army Ad Aggravation. Washington, D. C.: The Washington Times, 2001.
- Crawley, Vince, Pentagon Officials Stress Need To Meet Recruiting Challenge. Washington, D. C.: The Army Times, 2001.
- Scarborough, Rowan, Army Training Centers Get failing Grades. Washington, D. C.: The Washington Times, 2000.
- U. S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief--Health, Social Welfare, Government, Employment. Washington, D. C.: USA Statistics in Brief, 2000.
- U. S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief—Population and Vital Statistics. Washington, D. C.: USA Statistics in Brief, 2000.

U. S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief—Resident Population Projections, by Age and Sex: 1999 to 2050. Washington, D. C.: USA Statistics in Brief, 2000.

Maze, Rick, Shelton: QDR Flaws Burden Personnel. Washington, D. C.: The Army Times, 2000.

Scarborough, Rowan, General Details Army Shortfall. Washington, D. C.: The Washington Times, 2001.

Stone, Andrea and Moniz, Dave, Next President Must Transform USA's Forces. Washington, D. C. USA Today, 2000.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1998.

Army Modernization Plan 2001.